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Tuesday, July 7, 2020 | History

4 edition of Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe found in the catalog.

Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe

A. Mitchell Polinsky

Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe

by A. Mitchell Polinsky

  • 76 Want to read
  • 28 Currently reading

Published by National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, MA .
Written in English

    Subjects:
  • Fines (Penalties) -- Economic aspects.,
  • Costs (Law) -- Mathematical models.,
  • Wealth.

  • Edition Notes

    StatementA. Mitchell Polinsky.
    SeriesNBER working paper series ;, working paper 10760, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;, working paper no. 10760.
    ContributionsNational Bureau of Economic Research.
    Classifications
    LC ClassificationsHB1
    The Physical Object
    FormatElectronic resource
    ID Numbers
    Open LibraryOL3476049M
    LC Control Number2005615506

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Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe by A. Mitchell Polinsky Download PDF EPUB FB2

Get this from a library. Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe. [A Mitchell Polinsky; National Bureau of Economic Research.]. Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe. This article studies optimal fines when an offender's wealth is private information that can be obtained by the enforcement authority only after a costly audit.

I derive the optimal fine for the underlying offense, the optimal fine for misrepresenting one's wealth level, and the Cited by: Get this from a library.

Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe. [A Mitchell Polinsky; National Bureau of Economic Research.] -- "This article studies optimal fines when an offender's wealth is private information that can be obtained by the enforcement authority only after a costly audit.

I derive the optimal fine for the. Optimal Fines and Auditing When Wealth is Costly to Observe A. Mitchell Polinsky. NBER Working Paper No. Issued in September NBER Program(s):Law and Economics This article studies optimal fines when an offender's wealth is private information that can be obtained by the enforcement authority only after a costly audit.

Optimal Fines and Auditing When Wealth is Costly to Observe Article in International Review of Law and Economics 26(3) February with 16 Reads How we measure 'reads'Author: A. Mitchell Polinsky. Downloadable.

This article studies optimal fines when an offender’s wealth is private information that can be obtained by the enforcement authority only after a costly audit.

I derive the optimal fine for the underlying offense, the optimal fine for misrepresenting one’s wealth level, and the optimal audit probability.

I demonstrate that the optimal fine for misrepresenting wealth equals. This article studies optimal fines when an offender’s wealth is private information that can be obtained by the enforcement authority only after a costly audit.

I derive the optimal fine for the underlying offense, the optimal fine for misrepresenting one’s wealth level, and. Mitchell Polinsky, "Optimal Fines and Auditing When Wealth is Costly to Observe," Discussion PapersStanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.

Mitchell Polinsky, "Optimal Fines and Auditing When Wealth is Costly to Observe," NBER Working PapersNational Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

August OPTIMAL FINES AND AUDITING WHEN WEALTH IS COSTLY TO OBSERVE A. Mitchell Polinsky* Abstract: This article studies optimal fines when an offender’s wealth is private information that can be obtained by the enforcement authority only after a.

A book of the names and address of people living in a city Can liability insurance cover fines and and liability for accidents' 'Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe. Economics of Enforcement. Optimal Fines and Auditing When Wealth is Costly to Observe. This article studies optimal fines when an offender's wealth is private information that can be Author: Ernie Hood.

This article surveys the economic analysis of public enforcement of law – the use Polinsky, A. The optimal use of fines and imprisonment when wealth is unobservable. Journal of Public Economics – CrossRef Google Scholar.

Polinsky, A. Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe. International. Law, Public Enforcement of. Authors; Authors and affiliations Polinsky, A. The optimal use of fines and imprisonment when wealth is unobservable.

Journal of Public Econom – CrossRef Google Scholar. Polinsky, A. Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe. International Review of Law and Economics. NBER Working Paper No. (Also Reprint No.

r) Issued in January NBER Program(s):Law and Economics. An important result in the economic theory of enforcement is that, under certain circumstances, it is optimal for a fine to be as high as possible - to equal the entire wealth of individuals.

Strategic models of auditor-inspectee interaction have neglected implementation details in multiple-inspectee settings. With multiple inspectees, the target audit probability derived from the standard analysis can be implemented with sampling plans differing in the budgets committed to support them.

Overly committed audit budgets tie up unneeded resources that could have. Strategic models of auditor-inspectee interaction have neglected implementation details in multiple-inspectee settings.

With multiple inspectees, the target audit probability derived from the standard analysis can be implemented with sampling. Efficient Committed Budget for Implementing Target Audit Probability for Many Inspectees. By Andrew Yim. Book-Tax Differences and Inland Revenue Audit Adjustments31 in New Zealand," Optimal Fines and Auditing When Wealth is Costly to Observe," International Review of Law and Economics, Author: Andrew Yim.

Start studying Business & Government Relations Final. Learn vocabulary, terms, and more with flashcards, games, and other study tools. Search. redistribution of wealth d) deadweight loss Imposing fines for not wearing a seat belt is an example of monitoring.

Moral hazard is also reduced by breaking the link between cost increases and. The chapter is outlined as follows. We begin in section 2 by considering the rationale for public enforcement of law, that is, by asking why society cannot rely exclusively on private enforcement of law to control undesirable behavior.

We then state the problem of public enforcement of law in general terms in section by: Reviews. Knechel and Salterio’s Auditing: Assurance and Risk is an innovative book that takes a wide ranging approach to the auditor’s assessment of an organization’s environment and business new edition is a valuable update of this approach.

David Hay, The University of Auckland Business School, New Zealand. Two features set this textbook apart from many others. Accounting & Auditing Research [et al Thomas Weirich] on *FREE* shipping on qualifying : Thomas Weirich, et al.

Polinsky, A. M. “Optimal Fines and Auditing When Wealth Is Costly to Observe.” International Review of Law and Economics – Crossref Google Scholar.

Polinsky, A. M., and S. Shavell “The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law.” In Handbook of Law and Economics, edited by A. ky and l, 1. Amsterdam: by: Start studying Accounting Ch. 6. Learn vocabulary, terms, and more with flashcards, games, and other study tools.